Does your Parliament passively accept the draft bills provided by tax authorities or does it discuss them in detail and introduce changes to them?
A draft is handled by a committee before the Parliament goes to vote. The committee has the power to change or amend the draft, but in times of a stable parliamentary majority this is not very common. Usually, the political minority makes a reservation against the draft.
1.4.How does the literature in your country and your domestic Courts interpret the situation as you described it in 1.3. ?
To my knowledge, this has not been seen as a problem.
The meaning of legal indeterminacy in tax matters
2.1.Is your domestic tax legislation vague, when defining the tax object, tax subject and/or tax base, leaving a large margin for discretion, or, is it, on the contrary, very detailed, avoiding indeterminate concepts?
Since taxes only can be levied with support of a statute, tax law cannot be too vague. The rule of law demands that indeterminate language is not used. But even if there is an ambition from the legislator to avoid the use of indeterminate legislation it is not possible to write statutes that do not need interpretation or filling out. The legislator also has different ambitions regarding different kinds of tax law. In case of the so called close companies, legislation has always been very detailed. As soon as a gap, which could be used by the taxpayer, has been recognized, it is soon filled out by the legislator. But there is a central part of the income tax law that has not been regulated very specific. This was obvious when some of the close company rules were abandoned in 1999 and superseded by common tax law principles. These were not regulated in detail, but derived from the principal statement in the Swedish income tax act that all income that derives from an employment should be taxed. However, in some cases it was not even quite clear how these common principles should be applies in different cases.
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Sometimes the legislator leaves a large margin of discretion to the courts to fill out details in a rather vague legislation. I believe that it is generally accepted that it is impossible for the legislator to write statutes that do not need interpretation or filling out.
2.3.Are there independent domestic Courts obliged to control the constitutionality of tax legislation?
According to the constitution (RF 11:14) , every court or public authority has the obligation not to apply a statute that obviously is in breech with a statute of a higher level, for example a tax act that does not comply with the constitution. It is however extremely rare that a statute given by the Parliament has been found unconstitutional. One example is the case of NJA 2000 s. 132, where transitional regulations regarding the application of a change in a statute where found in breech with the constitution. It is very rare that tax legislation has been found in breech of the prohibition of retroactive taxation to the disadvantage of the tax payer in RF 2:10.
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It is more common that regulations given by the government or by the tax authority has been found unconstitutional, since these bodies does not have any competence to give binding tax law. 2.4.Is legal indeterminacy considered to be unconstitutional/ has a tax rule ever been declared unconstitutional due to legal indeterminacy?
Legal indeterminacy is not in it self unconstitutional. If a tax rule is vague it has to be interpretated by the tax authority and the administrative courts. But since there is a a prohibition against taxation without the support of a tax act given by the Parliament a rule that is too vague can not be the ground for taxation. It has been observed by the doctrine that the Supreme Administrative Court has in recent years been more reluctant to interpretate a tax rule far from the central wording regardless if it is in the benefit of the tax payer or the tax authority. 
The consequences of legal indeterminacy in tax matters
3.1.In case of legal indeterminacy not considered to be unconstitutional, who has the final word regarding the interpretation of the rule -the tax authorities or the domestic Courts?
The Supreme Administrative Court (of course except in matters regarding EC Tax Law.)
3.2.Is there a constitutional basis for either the tax authorities or the domestic Courts having the final word on interpretation of indeterminate legal rules?
This is not pointed out in wording in the constitution, except that no public authority may decide how a court should judge in a single case. 8 But since the decisions of the tax authority can be appealed to the administrative courts it is obvious that the Supreme Administrative Court has the final word.
3.3.Is legal indeterminacy normally fulfilled by regulations, administrative rulings and/or case law?
As mentioned above, the space for the government to make binding rules is very limited and is in the same way limited for the Tax Administration. Binding rules can only be given when there is an authorization regarding the execution of the statute given by the Parliament. (RF 8:13) In the same, way, the Tax Administration has a very limited space to provide binding regulations. In some cases, the Supreme Administration Court have found that the Tax authority has gone beyond its competence and regulated matters which according to the constitution should be given in law by the Parliament. However, the tax authority produces a lot of non binding material. Of most importance are the common advices, which are in theory not binding for either the tax payer or the tax authority, but in practice are followed strictly by the tax authority and to large extent by the courts. 
Relationship between the Tax Administration and the Domestic Tax Courts:
4.1. Do your domestic Courts control application of tax law by your Tax Administration?
The Courts does not control the application of tax law by the Tax Administration except when there is an appeal from a taxpayer against a decision from the Tax Administration.
4.2. Do your domestic Courts, in their case law, take into account rulings and binding information emerging from your Tax Administration?
Binding regulations must be taken in account by the courts, but as described above, common advices are not binding for the courts, but often followed.
4.3. Does your Tax Administration take into account the domestic courts case law and/or the ECJ case law when applying the law?
At the time of the Swedish adhesion to the EU, knowledge of EC tax law was limited at the Tax Administration. Since then, a major increase in competence has been made. The Tax Administration closely follows the development regarding direct and indirect taxation in the ECJ case law. It has been observed in the doctrine that the tax authority sometimes might take the position of a constitutional court and declare national legislation incompatible with the community law. The case law of the domestic courts are not legally binding in Sweden, even if decisions by the Supreme Administrative Court are normally followed by lower courts and by the tax authority. Of course, the tax administration is bound by the principle of loyalty to fulfill the demands of community law. The tax administration does not openly try to circumvent decisions by the Supreme administrative court. But the administration is likely to arguer that the circumstances in the pending case are not the same as in the court decision.
Relationship between different legal sources (legal pluralism):
5.1. How do your Parliament, Tax Administration and Courts react before the different legal sources in tax matters (tax treaties and other treaties, EC Treaty, secondary law and soft law)?
When a new tax act or changes in an existing act is being prepared in the Ministry of Finance, EC law is normally taken in consideration. Of course, interpretation of EC law is sometimes made in a way benefiting for the fiscal interest. According to RF 8:3 regulations regarding the condition between the private person (or the company) must be given in the form of a Parliamentary act. This has not only been interpretated as a hindrance for the government or the Tax Administration to establish binding regulations except regarding execution of Parliamentary acts. Furthermore, it has been seen as a hindrance for the tax administration or a court to levy tax without the support of a Parliamentary act.
5.3. Does the taxpayer have access to different legal remedies that assure him/her effective protection of his/her rights granted by tax treaties, EC law and domestic law, or are those legal remedies in fact limited to protection of rights granted by domestic law?
The tax payer has rather generous possibilities to apply against a decision. An appeal (or a demand for a new decision by the Tax Administration) can be made up to six years after the year when the entrance of tax liability occurred. The formal possibility of an appeal does of course not necessarily mean that the tax payer will have success. EC law is supposed to be protected by domestic law. In cases of misbehavior by the Tax Administration, it is possible to make a complaint at the Justitieombudsmannen (JO). The outcome of such complains can however only be that the Tax Administration can be citied. If an obvious error has been made, it is possible to apply for damage according to 3 chapt. 2 § act of damages (1972:207) . 3.4. Is a final judicial decision on a single tax case, followed by the Tax Administration not only in this case but also in all other similar cases? never -sometimes -oftenvery often 3.5. How does the Tax Administration react when it is convinced that the final judicial decision is wrong or not "acceptable" because, e.g., it is too expensive for the public? a) Does it accept the (from their point of view) wrong decision? never -sometimesoften -very often b) Does it try in another similar case to convince the Court to decide in a different way? never -sometimes -often -very often c) Does it try to influence the Parliament to change the law? never -sometimes -often -very often d) Does it make sure that the Internal Revenue Service will not follow this decision in similar cases? never -sometimes -often -very often not applicable e) Does it try "to hide" such a decision, e.g., not publishing the decision with the result that the Internal Revenue Service does not know this decision? never -sometimesoften -very often
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not applicable
If possible, please add statistics to the answers!
